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Abstract 
Adopting a comparative analysis, this article examines some of the recent 
cases of litigation which have focused on indigenous peoples’ rights across the 
African continent. The aim is to explore the potentials but also the challenges 
and limitations of litigation as a tool for supporting the rights of indigenous 
peoples in Africa. The article explores to what extent an African jurisprudence 
is emerging from these cases on issues that are essential to indigenous peoples 
such as non-discrimination, self-identification, land rights and development. It 
also focuses on the practical issues that arise with engaging with litigation to 
explore to what extent it could contribute to the legal empowerment of some 
of the most marginalised communities in Africa. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is estimated that approximately 50 million indigenous peoples live across the 
African continent. 1  Commonly across the continent, they face hardship, 
discrimination, non-recognition of their rights to lands and natural resources, as well 
as high level of economic, social and cultural marginalization.2 In many parts of 
Africa, indigenous communities are forced out of their ancestral lands to make room 
for the establishment of wildlife reserves, tourism resorts, or to allow the extraction of 
natural resources. All these issues have been examined and analysed in a ground-
breaking report issued in 2003 by the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
which provides an in-depth analysis of the situation of indigenous peoples in Africa.3 
∗ Professor of International and Comparative Law, University of East London (UK), contact: jeremie.gilbert@uel.ac.uk This article is based on a presentation given at the Half-Day Workshop on 'Adjudication and Indigenous Peoples' organised at Queen Mary University, London in January 2016. The author would like to thanks Chris Kidd, Ben Begbie-Clench, Maria Sapignoli, Lucy Claridge and Paul McHugh for comments on an early draft of the article. 1 See International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs, at http://www.iwgia.org/regions/africa  2 On the situation of indigenous peoples in Africa, see R. Laher and K. Singí Oei (eds), Indigenous 
People in Africa: Contestations, Empowerment and Group Rights (Africa Institute of South Africa, 2014); S. Dersso (ed.), Perspectives on the Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in Africa (PULP, 2010) 3  Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities submitted in accordance with ‘Resolution on the Rights of Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights at its 28th ordinary session (2005). 
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As noted in this report, the rights of indigenous peoples are often a very controversial 
and complex issue across the continent. The definition and scope of indigenous 
peoples’ rights are usually contentious in most African countries. At the national 
level, most of the States are still reluctant to recognise the specific rights of 
indigenous peoples. 4  The term ‘indigenous peoples’ itself is usually seen as 
contentious issue.5 The term is often seen as a “western invention”, which might be 
relevant in countries which have witnessed large influx of white settlers such as 
Australia, the United States or Canada, but not for Africa. Several States have argued 
that the reference to being “first and original occupants” of a territory, which is 
implied by the term indigenous, is not relevant to Africa. 6  This debate on the 
definition of who are the indigenous peoples of Africa, and whether this legal 
category is relevant to the continent, has undermined progress on the protection of the 
rights of indigenous peoples in Africa.7  
 
There are signs of the emergence of new legal frameworks to recognise and 
protect indigenous peoples’ rights across the continent. The new constitution of 
Kenya, adopted in 2010, recognises “historically marginalized groups”, including 
indigenous peoples. The constitution of Cameroon also mentions indigenous peoples, 
and in Burundi the constitution provides for special representation of the indigenous 
Batwa people in the National Assembly and the Senate. In 2010, the Central African 
Republic became the first African country to ratify the ILO Convention No. 169; and 
in 2011, the Republic of Congo became the first African country to adopt a specific 
law on the promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous populations. 
Nonetheless, despite these significant changes in the legal landscape relating to 
indigenous peoples’ rights, most indigenous peoples still do not have access to legal 
remedies, and most national legal systems do not specifically recognise and protect 
their rights. With this lack of specific legal protection, one solution is often to turn to 
courts to seek legal remedies. There have been considerable efforts by many 
communities across the continent to develop their legal and advocacy capacity to seek 
legal remedies.8 In the last few years, many communities have engaged with litigation 
as a potential way to get the recognition of their rights and challenge the 
discrimination they face. There have been some important decisions at the regional 
level, notably with the adoption of a decision against Kenya in 2010 by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Commission concerning the indigenous 
4 See: F. Thornberry and F. Viljoen, Overview Report on the Constitutional and Legislative 
Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 24 African Countries (International Labour Organization and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2009). 5 W. van Genugten, “Protection of Indigenous Peoples on the African Continent: Concepts, Position Seeking, and the Interaction of Legal Systems”, (2010) 104 (1) A.J.I.L. 29  6 See: J. Ngugi, “The Decolonisation-modernisation Interface and the Plight of Indigenous Peoples in Post-colonial Development Discourse in Africa”, (2002) 20 Wisconsin International Law Journal 289  7  See F. Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for 
Empowerment of 'Marginalized' Communities (Springer, 2011) 8 See G. Wachira Mukundi, and T. Karjala, ‘Advocacy for indigenous peoples’ rights in Africa’, in 
Indigenous People in Africa: Contestations, Empowerment and Group Rights (2014): 104. 
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Endorois community.9 The decision has been hailed as a “landmark” as it touches on 
several crucial issues regarding the development of indigenous peoples’ rights in 
Africa.10 There is also one case that is currently examined by the recently established 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.11 In parallel to the emergence of a 
regional jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ rights, there is an increased use of 
national courts as a place to seek remedies and recognition by indigenous peoples. In 
the last decade there has been some important cases at the national levels, including 
rulings form the High Court of Botswana12, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
or the High Court of Uganda13 for examples. There are also important cases that are 
currently been examined by the Constitutional Court of Uganda and the High Court of 
Namibia.14  
 
This articles wishes to examine some of these cases to assess their potential 
impact for the protection and the development of indigenous peoples’ rights. The aim 
is to explore the potentials but also the challenges and limitations of litigation as a 
tool for supporting the rights of indigenous peoples in Africa. For that purpose the 
article focuses on cases that have been articulated as being within the legal field of 
indigenous peoples’ rights, either by the applicants, the judges, the lawyers or civil 
society advocates involved in the cases. This includes cases which have been finally 
ruled, having reached the highest level of possible appeal, or cases which are still on-
going within the court system. Apart from the content of the cases and the 
jurisprudence they create, it is important to analyse these cases in terms of the larger 
legal, political, economic and social impact they have (or not) to promote and protect 
the rights of indigenous peoples. Increasingly questions have been raised about the 
‘value’ of litigation, and more specifically about strategic litigation, as an efficient 
tool to challenge embedded forms of discrimination faced by indigenous peoples. An 
issue which notably relates to the lack of implementation of the courts’ decisions, but 
also the cost and time involved in litigation, as well as the limitations of the legal 
language to address very complex socio-economical issues faced by indigenous 
9 Communication 276/2003, Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights 
Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya (2010) 10 See J. Gilbert, “Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in Africa: the Pragmatic Revolution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 60.01 (2011): 245-270. 11 In March 2013 the Court issued an order of provisional measures in respect of the situation of the Ogiek of the Mau Forest in Kenya, prohibiting land transactions in the Mau Forest Reserve protected area and other actions likely to prejudice the Ogiek’s claim. The case was heard in November 2014 and the case remains pending, with judgment scheduled for 2017. 12  Roy Sesana (First Applicant), Keiwa Setlhobogwa and 241 others, (Second and Further 
Applicants) v. the Attorney General of the Republic of Botswana, High Court of Botswana, 2006; and  Matsipane Mosetlhanyene (First Appellant) and Gakenyatsiwe Matsipane (Second Appellant,) 
v. the Attorney General (Respondent), High Court of Botswana, 27 January, 2011.  13  Consent Judgment and Decree, Uganda Land Alliance, Ltd. v. Uganda Wildlife Auth., Miscellaneous Cause No. 0001 of 2004 (High Court of Uganda at Mbale) 14 The case concerns the forced eviction of the San from the Etosha National Park. A demand for a class action is presently examined by the court, see http://www.osisa.org/indigenous-peoples/namibia/haiom-set-make-legal-history-etosha-aboriginal-land-claim  
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peoples. Overall, the aim of this article is to explore the potentials of litigation as a 
tool for advocacy across the continent. 
 
To undertake this task, the article is divided into four different thematic 
sections. The first section examines how courts have engaged with the legal concept 
of indigenous peoples, notably focusing on definition and discrimination. The second 
section explores how courts have dealt with the crucial issue of land rights, which is 
seen as essential elements of indigenous peoples’ rights.15 The third section focuses 
on the issue of development, conservation and tourism, three ‘ingredients’ that often 
result in the forced displacement of indigenous peoples. It examines how courts have 
dealt with the argument put forward by States authorities that the forced displacement 
of indigenous communities is necessary to support development, enhance 
conservation or promote tourism. The final section is focusing on legal strategies with 
the aim of critically examining the value of litigation as tool of empowerment for 
marginalised indigenous communities.  
 
 
I.  ‘INDIGENOUSNESS’, ‘AUTHENTICITY’ AND DISCRIMINATION  
 
Most, if not all, indigenous communities face discrimination, lack of 
recognition and marginalisation. In most cases the first step in litigation is to claim 
their right as indigenous peoples, to be recognised as citizens of the State with equal 
rights, but also with special entitlement against discrimination to fight embedded 
forms of racism they are usually facing. At the heart of this claim is the call to 
recognise that, as a specific category of rights holders, indigenous peoples are entitled 
to be recognised as holders of specific non-discriminatory policies. 16  Most 
governments across the continent have resisted the development of specific 
legislations, or policies, which would put in place special measures to address the 
entrenched discrimination faced by indigenous peoples. Many governments have put 
forward the argument that all inhabitants are indigenous to the continent, and that 
therefore the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ as developed under international law is 
irrelevant.17 Governmental policies and directives often rely on a colonial approach to 
the notion of ‘indigenous’ or ‘native’ peoples under which all Africans (as opposed to 
settlers and colonisers) were labelled as ‘indigenous’ or ‘natives’. The notion of 
indigenous peoples has greatly evolved over the last few decades, acquiring a 
contemporary interpretation, which modifies the colonial approach which defined all 
15 A. Barume, Indigenous Peoples Land Rights in Africa (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2nd revised edition 2015). 16 See Benedict Kingsbury, “Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples' Claims in International and Comparative Law”, NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 34 (2001): 189; Patrick Thornberry, “Confronting racial discrimination: a CERD perspective”, 5.2. Human Rights Law Review  239-269 (2005) 17 See Albert K. Barume, “Responding to the Concerns of the African States”, in Claire Charters, and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds.), Making The Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on 
The Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA, 2009) 
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the inhabitants of the continent as ‘indigenous’ and ‘natives’. Hence an important 
element the litigation process is often to get court to apply and recognise this 
contemporary approach to indigenous peoples’ rights. 
 
A. ‘Authenticity’ and ‘Indigenous’ Rights in Botswana  
 
Over the last decade Botswana has been at the centre of litigation on 
indigenous peoples’ rights, which has attracted significant attention nationally, 
regionally and internationally.18  At the heart of the legal battle was the claim of the 
San and Bakgalagadi residents of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) - 
Botswana’s largest protected area and the second largest game reserve in Africa - that 
they had been illegally removed from their ancestral land by the government. There 
have been issues about the rights of the indigenous community in the CKGR for many 
years as the reserve was established in 1961, but everything accelerated in 1997 when 
the people of Xade in the reserve were relocated, and the situation worsened in 2002 
when the government informed the remaining residents of the CKGR that they were 
shutting down the wells and stopping all food deliveries inside the reserve.19 The 
government then proceeded with the removal of the peoples and their possessions out 
of the reserve. The residents decided to challenge their removal in court.20 
 
Whilst the litigation was mainly about determining the rights to land and 
services for the indigenous communities, the issue of determining the specific rights 
of the CKGR inhabitants as an indigenous community was also fundamental. The 
government of Botswana is well-known for its opposition to the notion of indigenous 
peoples’ rights.21 A constant argument of the government’s lawyers in the court case 
was that the San residents of the CKGR were not entitled to any specific rights, but 
should be treated as any other citizens of the State. Based on this approach, the 
argument put forward was that the San resident of the CKGR should be removed from 
their land to ensure their access to ‘modernisation’ and ‘progress’ like any other 
citizens of the country. One of the justifications to justify their forced relocation was 
to bring their standards of living up to the level of the rest of the country. As the 
minister for local government put it: “We as governments simply believe that it is 
18 Central Kalahari Legal Case No. MISCA 52/2002 in the Matter between Roy Sesana, First 
Applicant, Keiwa Setlhobogwa and 241 others, Second and Further Applicants, and the Attorney 
General High Court of Botswana (2006); High Court Civil Case No. MAHLB 000 393-09 In the 
matter between Matsipane Mosetlhanyene, First Appellant, and Gakenyatsiwe Matsipane, Second 
Appellant, and the Attorney General Respondent (2011) 19 See: M. Sapignoli and R. Hitchcock, “A Chronology of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve: Update III, 2002 – 2012, Botswana Notes and Records, Volume 45; and R. Hitchcock, M. Sapignoli, and W. Babchuk, “What about Our Rights? Settlements, Subsistence, and Livelihood Security among Central Kalahari San and Bakgalagadi” 15 (1) The International Journal of Human Rights (2011), 67-87. 20 Their case was first dismissed but went on appeal in to the High Court, see: High Court of Botswana, Roy Sesana, Kiewa Setlhobogwa, & 241 Others v the Attorney General of Botswana, Case No. 52 of 2002. 21 Botswana was one of the governments which derailed the process for the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2006.  
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totally unfair to leave a portion of our citizen undeveloped under the pretext that we 
are allowing them to practice their culture.” 22 During the trial, the government’s 
lawyers put forward the fact that the applicants’ were “no longer authentic” because 
they were not hunting and gathering full-time, as they had in the past, and were 
involved in agriculture, livestock production, and migrant labour. On the other side of 
the spectrum, the legal counsel for the applicants referred to the concept of indigenous 
peoples rights as developed under international law, highlighting the need for the 
court to recognise their entitlements as specific indigenous rights. As analysed by 
Hitchcock, Sapignoli and Babchuk:  
 
The San of Botswana, in defining themselves as ‘indigenous’ before and during the Central 
Kalahari court case, did so purposely. They sought to re-assert their rights, using the concept 
of indigeneity as a means of defining themselves as a group that: (1) was different from the 
majority population; (2) that historically had been mistreated and discriminated against; and 
(3) that this treatment occurred in part because of their lifestyles and distinct cultural 
attributes.23 
 
The recognition of the concerned CKGR residents as indigenous peoples was an 
important element of their legal claims. Most important was to recognize the CKGR 
inhabitants as the “Bushmen” mentioned in Article 14.3.c of the Constitution, as the 
people having certain rights to reside in Reserve. As noted by Sapignoli, the San and 
Bakgalagadi “in speaking about indigeneity, entering the Court and adopting its 
language, found a way to obtain their rights.” 24 As she noted: “(…) indigeneity in 
Africa is a recent identity claim born in the 1990s with the emergence of the 
international indigenous movement and international law and organizations on 
indigenous peoples. The Botswana Court Case and Bushmen’s self-identification as 
indigenous peoples cannot be understood without considering these local, national, 
and global relationships.”25 During the court hearings a lot of emphasis was put on the 
anthropological experts to ‘prove’ the originality and ‘authenticity’ of the indigenous 
claims. Ultimately, the High Court recognised the right of the community to live on 
their ancestral territory. In reaching this decision, two of the judges, specifically 
highlighted the need to recognise them as indigenous, with Justice Dow noting: “the 
fact the applicants belong to a class of peoples that have now come to be recognized 
as ‘indigenous peoples’ is of relevance.”26 As highlighted by the judge this meant that 
the relevant international legal principles regarding indigenous peoples’ rights, and 
notably the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
22 CCJ 2006, Bundle 1A 104 (ExP32)- Letter from Minister Margaret Nasha to Ditshwanelo, dated 7 January 2002- as quoted in M. Sapignoli, “Dispossession in the Age of Humanity: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Indigeneity in the Central Kalahari”, (2015) 25 (3) Anthropological Forum, pp. 285-305  23 R. Hitchcock, M. Sapignoli, and W. Babchuk, supra note 19, at 63. 24 M. Sapignoli, “Indigeneity and the expert: Negotiating identity in the case of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve”, (2009) 12 Law and Anthropology: Current Legal Issues 247-68. 25 Ibid, at 267. 26 CCJ, 2006, at 201. 
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(ICERD) were relevant to the case.27 More generally, all the judges accepted the fact 
that being recognised as ‘indigenous peoples’ meant that the colonial acquisition of 
their land and the following post-independence land legislation had not extinguished 
their rights to use their ancestral territories. Knowing how the government was putting 
pressure on rejecting this legal approach recognising the relevance of indigenous 
peoples’ rights in the country, this certainly is an important legal development.    
 
B. The ‘Invisible’ Batwa of Uganda  
 
In 2013, several members of Batwa communities of Southwest Uganda have 
submitted a petition to the Constitutional Court.28 The petition is seeking recognition 
of their status as indigenous peoples, redress for the historic marginalisation and 
discrimination they are facing, and compensation for the continuous human rights 
violations they have experienced as a result of being dispossessed of their ancestral 
lands. The Batwa have been gradually evicted from their lands following the creation 
of national parks in the forests covering their ancestral territories.29 The establishment 
of these national parks started during the colonial time in the 1930s, but many Batwa 
continued to live in the forest and to use its resources until the 1990s when they were 
evicted, without consultation, adequate compensation or offer of alternative land. As a 
result the Batwa have been living at the borders of the parks becoming squatters on 
other peoples’ land, leading them towards severe poverty, malnutrition and health 
problems.30 This loss of their lands and sources of livelihood is accentuated by the 
high levels of discrimination they are facing in the Ugandan society.31 In general, the 
Batwa suffer from extreme and embedded forms of discrimination from the 
mainstream society. 32 As a result they notably suffer from forced labour, lack of 
27 On the role of ICERD and indigenous peoples, see: P. Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and 
Human Rights (Manchester UP, 2002), pp. 199-ss 28 For detailed information about the Batwa, see: J. Lewis, The Batwa Pygmies of the Great Lakes 
Region (MRG, 2000); J. Woodburn, “Indigenous discrimination: the ideological basis for local discrimination against hunter-gatherer minorities in sub-Saharan Africa”, Ethical and Racial Studies, Vol. 20, No.2, 1997, pp. 345-361; Jackson, D., Twa Women Twa Rights in the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa, (Minority Rights Group International, 2003); Nelson, J. and Hossack, L. (eds.), 
From principles to practice: Indigenous peoples and protected areas in Africa (Forest Peoples programme, 2003). 29 The Batwa’s ancestral territory covers several areas of the Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Mgahinga Gorilla National Park and Echuya Central Forest Reserve. 30 Lea Berrang-Ford and all, “Vulnerability of indigenous health to climate change: A case study of Uganda's Batwa Pygmies”, Social science & medicine 75.6 (2012): 1067-1077; Sherilee Harper, "Social Determinants of Health for Uganda’s Batwa”, Africa Portal, June 2012: 32. 31 See: C. Kidd, “Inventing the “Pygmy”: Representing the “Other”, Presenting the “Self”, (2009) 20.4 History and Anthropology 395-418. 32 See: C. Kidd, “Development Discourse and the Batwa of South West Uganda: Representing the ‘Other’: Presenting the ‘Self.’” (Unpublished PhD thesis, Glasgow 2008), available at: http://theses.gla.ac.uk/169/ ; C. Kidd and P. Zaninka, “Securing Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Conservation: A Review of South-West Uganda” (Forest Peoples Programme and United Organisation for Batwa Development in Uganda, 2008).  
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political representation and participation, lack of access to education, housing, 
healthcare, social security and benefits.33   
 
One of the arguments put forward by the Batwa in their petition to the 
Constitutional Court relates to their recognition as indigenous peoples. The 
government has so far rejected their claims as indigenous peoples, not recognising 
their specific rights to land and natural resources, and not acknowledging the need to 
develop special measures to address the discrimination they are facing. In its Third 
Schedule, the 1995 Constitution lists ‘indigenous communities’. However, this 
Schedule is based on its colonial roots listing all the ‘Tribes’ existing or residing 
within the colonial borders of Uganda as of 1926. Hence the Constitution adopts a 
very colonial tone by labelling all ethnic groups of the country as indigenous peoples, 
but not putting in place special measures of protection for the most marginalised 
indigenous communities. In the petition and in the experts affidavits submitted to the 
Constitutional Court, the importance of using contemporary standards of definition 
used at international and regional levels has been put forward as an essential element 
of their claim. The petitioners have invited the Court to consider the definition 
proposed by the Working Group on Indigenous Population/Communities of the 
African Commission (WGIP) which defines indigenous peoples based on the 
characteristics that: 
 
a) their culture and way of life differ considerably from the dominant society, to the extent that 
their culture is under threat of extinction; 
b) the survival of their particular way of life depends on access to lands and natural resources; 
c) they suffer from discrimination as they are being regarded as less developed and less 
advanced than other more dominant sectors of society; 
d) they often live in inaccessible regions and are often geographically isolated; 
e) they are subject to domination and exploitation within national political and economic 
structures.34 
 
The petitioners have further highlighted that the African Commission has further 
clarified that the term indigenous populations does not mean ‘first inhabitants’ in 
reference to aboriginality as opposed to non-African communities or those having 
come from elsewhere. As noted by the African Commission: “....if the concept of 
indigenous is exclusively linked with a colonial situation, it leaves us without a 
33 See: K. Kabananukye and D. Kwagala, Culture, Minorities and linguistic Rights in Uganda: The 
Case of The Batwa and The Ik (KHURIPEC working paper No.11); N. Mukasa, “The Batwa Indigenous People in Uganda and their Detachment from Forest Livelihood: Land Eviction and Social Plight”, (2012) Yearbook on Humanitarian Action and Human Right 71-84; The Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, The Equal Opportunities Committee’s Working Visit to Bundibugyo and Kisoro Report (Government of Uganda, 2007) 34  Report of the African Commission Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Population/Communities submitted in accordance with the ‘Resolution on the rights of indigenous peoples/communities in Africa’ and adopted by the African Commission at its 28th ordinary session in November 2003 and published in 2005 
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suitable concept for analyzing the internal structural relationships of inequality that 
have persisted from colonial dominance.”35  
 
Relying on this approach, the petitioners want to challenge the historical (and 
colonial) classification of all tribes of the country as indigenous, and get a formal 
legal recognition by the court of their status as indigenous peoples. Hence, an 
important aspect of the petition is the demand to the Constitutional Court to recognise 
their self-identification as indigenous peoples as defined under international law. This 
recognition would notably entitle them to have access to specific affirmative action 
policies. Article 32 of the Constitution affirms that the government “shall take 
affirmative action in favour of groups marginalised on the basis of gender, age, 
disability or any other reason created by history, tradition or custom, for the purpose 
of redressing imbalances which exist against them.” Despite the widespread 
discrimination faced by the Batwa, the government has not developed any affirmative 
action polices to tackle such entrenched form of discrimination. In claiming their 
rights to be recognised as indigenous peoples who are facing historically embedded 
forms of discrimination, they are inviting the Constitutional Court to declare the 
government in breach of its constitutional obligation.  
 
This case as well as the previous case concerning Botswana, are showing the 
importance for the concerned communities to be able to articulate their rights under 
the banner of indigenous peoples’ rights. In these two cases (as well as in the cases 
that will be examined below), the lack of a proper legal framework coupled with the 
lack of political will to protect their rights as indigenous peoples has pushed the 
concerned communities to take legal action against the government. The recognition 
by the national courts that they are indigenous peoples constitutes an important first 
step in recognising them as historically discriminated societies entitled to specific 
rights, notably rights to lands and natural resources as examined below.  
 
 
II.   IN THE SHADOW OF COLONISATION: THE SURVIVAL OF 
CUSTOMARY LAND RIGHTS 
 
Undeniably the colonial history of the continent plays a significant role 
regarding indigenous peoples’ rights, and especially regarding their right to land. 
Colonial rules had a considerably negative impact on land rights for most indigenous 
peoples. When their land rights were not ignored they were seriously curtailed and 
ultimately submitted to the overall control of the colonial administration, notably 
under the system of trusteeship. This overall rejection of land rights for indigenous 
35 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Report of the African Commission's Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations Communities, submitted in accordance with the “Resolution on the Rights of Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa”, adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights at its 28th ordinary session (2005), pp. 92–93. 
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peoples was based on the discriminatory and racist theories of non-usage of the land 
and lack of ‘proper’ formal land tenure systems.36 In post-colonial Africa many of the 
independent States have not fundamentally rejected this approach and have 
maintained a statu quo ante which is often resulting in the forced expulsion of 
indigenous peoples from their ancestral lands. Hence an important question regarding 
the value of litigation is the capacity of the courts to reverse centuries of 
discriminatory practices that have rejected indigenous peoples’ land tenure systems as 
archaic and inexistent.  
 
A critical issue for many indigenous peoples is their lack of formal and official 
title to prove their land ownership. It is a global phenomenon not limited to Africa, 
but the colonial legacy and its connection with present day legislations governing land 
rights has, until recently, not been examined in the context of indigenous peoples’ 
rights. Under international law there is now a strong jurisprudence, notably emerging 
from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, highlighting that possession should 
constitute title to land property.37 This jurisprudence also puts forward the importance 
of recognising indigenous peoples’ own customary systems of tenures to recognise 
their rights to land. This issue has also been an important element of the jurisprudence 
of some of the common law jurisdictions from the period of the 1970s-1990s. 
Landmark rulings from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were based on the 
central importance of recognising that colonisation, and the post-colonial legal 
systems, have not extinguished indigenous peoples’ land rights. These rights are 
based on their own customary laws which have ‘survived’ colonisation and as such 
need to be recognised and protected by States.38 The issue in many African States is 
not entirely different from that post-colonial concept of Aboriginal or Native Title. 
Indeed, many communities are facing the same issue of having to ‘demonstrate’ their 
right to land based on their actual possession coupled with the claim that their land 
rights have survived colonisation, and therefore should be recognised and enforced by 
post-colonial courts. In most African Sates this jurisprudence could have an important 
effect as indeed most States have suffered from colonisation and its attached doctrines 
of land dispossessions and imposition of formalistic legal systems that ignored 
indigenous peoples’ ancestral possession. Besides early references to the notion of so-
called ‘Native Title’ in Privy Council decisions,39 until recently there was very little 
36 See J. Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors (2nd ed., Brill, 2016) 37 The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79 (2001); Moiwana Village v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. HR (ser. C) No. 124 (2005); Yakye Axa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay Inter-Am. Ct. HR (ser. C) No. 125 (2005); Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v Paraguay (2006); Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname Series C No. 172 (2007); Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay (2010. Series C No. 214);  Kichwa 
People of Sarayaku v Ecuador ( 2012. Series C No. 245); Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. 
Suriname (2015). 38 For a detailed and critical analysis, see P. McHugh, Aboriginal Title: The Modern Jurisprudence 
of Tribal Land Rights (OUP, 2011). 39 See case of Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary of Southern Nigeria, 2 A.C. 399 (1921); In re Southern 
Rhodesia [1919] A.C. 211, at 223—Privy Council 
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jurisprudence that had examined this post-colonial legacy of land rights. One of the 
first cases to examine this colonial legacy was in South Africa. 
 
A. The Survival of Customary Land Rights in South Africa 
 
Following the post-apartheid legacy on both land rights and non-
discrimination, the courts of South Africa have examined in details the connection 
between land rights and indigenous peoples’ rights in a case which reached both the 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.40 The concerned case was put forward 
by members of the Richtersveld community who brought a claim for the restoration of 
their ancestral land under the Restitution of Land Rights Act, a statutory mechanism 
giving effect to the government's constitutionally-mandated land reform and 
restitution programme. The Richtersveld community is a community of 
approximately 3,000 formerly nomadic and pastoralist people, who traditionally 
occupied a land that was then annexed by Alexkor, a State-owned diamond mine. 
When the land was annexed, the company argued that the community lost their rights 
to the land. The government contended that indigenous customary laws on ownership 
ceased with the annexation of South Africa by the British in 1847, and that this loss of 
rights was not a dispossession as envisaged under the post-apartheid land restitution 
act.  
 
An important aspect of the case was the community’s assertion that it used the 
land according to its “indigenous customs” and that such customary law interest had 
not been extinguished by colonisation and its following apartheid legacy. The case 
went from the local Land Court to the Supreme Court, and then the Constitutional 
Court. An essential element for the courts was to define whether the customary land 
rights of the community could constitute land rights as protected under the restitution 
of land act. One of the arguments was that the community had a right to the concerned 
land based on their own indigenous customary land rights, rights that were 
discriminatory ignored. At the lower levels, the claim was dismissed on the grounds 
that the claimants were dispossessed for the purpose of mining of diamonds and not 
because of racially discriminatory laws or practices. In appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal recognised that the dispossession of the community was racially 
discriminatory “because it was based upon the false, albeit unexpressed premise that, 
because of the Ritchersveld community’s race and lack of civilization, they had lost 
all rights in the land upon annexation.”41 The Court highlighted that even though the 
undisturbed possession of the land by the concerned indigenous community was 
ignored on discriminatory grounds, indigenous laws regarding land rights had 
40 See: T.M. Chan, “The Richtersveld Challenge: South Africa Finally Adopts Aboriginal Title’, in Indigenous Peoples Rights in Southern Africa”, R.. Hitchcock and D. Vinding (ed.), Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights in Southern Africa (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2004), 114–30 41 The Ritchersveld Community and Others and Alexkor Limited and the Government of South Africa, Case No. 488/2001, para. 8 (Mar. 24, 2003). 
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survived and extended to the current legal regime. The judges ruled that the 
Richtersveld community’s customary right of ownership had survived the annexation 
by the British Crown as “these rights constituted a ‘customary law interest’ and 
consequently a ‘right in land’.”42 As noted by the Court: “[A]n interest in land held 
under a system of indigenous law is thus expressly recognised as a ‘right in land,’ 
whether or not it was recognised by civil law as a legal right.”43 The Court ultimately 
recognised the Richersveld right to land based on their “customary law interest under 
their indigenous customary law entitling them to exclusive occupation and use of the 
subject land and that its interest was akin to the right of ownership held under 
common law.”44  
 
Both the company and the government challenged the ruling in front of the 
Constitutional Court alleging that the court of appeal was wrong in holding that the 
community had customary law interest in the subject land. A central aspect of their 
challenge was based on the colonial history of the land claim. Alexkor’s 
representatives put forward the fact that after annexation in 1847 by the British the 
land was not been granted under any form of tenure, as a result the British Crown 
became the only legal owner. Hence, from their perspective the community had lost 
its rights to land in 1847 as a result of the annexation. Joining the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, the Constitutional Court rejected this argument highlighting that colonial 
rules had not extinguished the customary land rights of the community. In 
highlighting the legal value of customary indigenous peoples’ land rights, the 
Constitutional Court stated: “indigenous law feeds into, nourishes, fuses with and 
becomes part of the amalgam of South African law.”45  
 
This ruling constitutes an important decision not only for the concerned 
community but also for many other indigenous communities who have also faced 
serious discrimination and non-recognition of their rights to land in South Africa. Due 
to the very unique post-apartheid legal regime on which this decision was based it is 
hard to foresee how such decision might translate to other jurisdictions outside South 
Africa. Nonetheless some aspects of this decision could offer some relevant legal 
developments outside the borders of South Africa, notably based on the fact that it 
highlights that colonisation and its following post-colonial legacy has not 
extinguished indigenous peoples’ land rights. This case also highlight the importance 
of the formal recognition of indigenous customary land laws. The cohabitation 
between customary laws and formal laws is extremely relevant for the whole 
continent as most indigenous peoples still predominately refer to customary land 
tenure systems as their main legal norms when it comes to land rights.  
 
42 Id. at para. 8. 43 Id. at para. 9. 44 Id. at para. 27. 45 Alexkor Limited and the Government of South Africa v. The Ritchersveld Community and Others, Case CCT 19/03, at 51 (Oct. 14, 2003). 
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B. Land and Natural Resources in Botswana 
 
Nearly at the same time another important legal battle on land rights was 
taking place across the border in Botswana. In the case concerning the CKGR 
mentioned earlier, one of the central issues for the court was to determine whether the 
indigenous community had any right to the land, and if so if their forced removal was 
illegal. To address this issue the judges had to examine the issue of survival of 
customary land laws and the nature and value of possession as constituting title. The 
High Court ruled in favour of the indigenous community highlighting that their 
possession based on customary law subsisted the creation of the game reserve both 
under colonial rules and in the post-independence period. The court highlighted that 
the forced removals of the concerned community and the denial of their rights to 
occupy their ancestral territory were unlawful and unconstitutional. As noted by ones 
of the judges, the establishment of the game reserve did not extinguish their 
customary land rights so the applicants “were in possession of the land that they 
lawfully occupied.”46 The court unanimously recognised the right of the applicants to 
live and reside in the reserve. In a similar approach to the one adopted by the judges 
in South Africa, an important element of the ruling was the recognition of the non-
extinguishment of indigenous peoples’ customary land rights under colonial rules and 
post-independent legislation.  
 
However, there were some serious limitations within the ruling of the High 
Court in 2006. First, the court ruled that the stopping of services was lawful and the 
government was not required to restore basic and essential services in the reserve.  
This led to the impossible situation for the community of having been recognised their 
rights to live on their ancestral land but not having the right to the water that could 
allow them to live on the land. During the forced relocation of the community outside 
the reserve, the authorities had destroyed several water tanks and sealed off some of 
the essential boreholes. This led to another court case which started in 2010. This time 
the focus was on the recognition of their right to access and use water resources. In 
particular the applicants sought permission to re-commission, at their own expense, a 
borehole that had been closed by the government. The applicants lost their case in 
first instance, the judge stating that “The Basarwa have chosen to settle in areas far 
from those facilities. They have become victims of their own decision to settle an 
inconveniently long distance from the services and facilities provided by the 
government.” This was overturned in appeal when the community was recognised its 
fundamental rights to access water. The court ruled that since the applicants were 
found in “lawful occupation” of their ancestral lands, they should have the right to 
drill their boreholes for domestic purposes. It has been a long legal battle for the 
46 Statement from Judge Phumpahi, Central Kalahari Legal Case No. MISCA 52/2002 in the Matter 
between Roy Sesana, First Applicant, Keiwa Setlhobogwa and 241 others, Second and Further 
Applicants, and the Attorney General High Court of Botswana (2006) 
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residents San community of the game reserve to gain their right to live on their lands, 
taking four different cases of litigation.47  
 
Some important lessons can be drawn from such process, and notably the 
importance of recognising the fundamental connection between land and natural 
resources. Indeed for many indigenous community, and not only the San, land rights 
relate to the rights to use and access the natural resources found on their territories, 
including water rights and also hunting and gathering rights. The second limitation of 
the case relates to the fact that the ‘legal’ victory concerns only a limited number of 
the original inhabitants of the reserve as only the applicants listed got the right to go 
back, not the whole communities who were forcedly removed. Whilst the case has 
often been perceived to be a victory for the San of Botswana, the reality is different as 
the case was filed to the court with the name of 243 specific applicants. Hence the 
decision concerns only these applicants not the entire concerned San communities. 
This restriction came as a late realisation for many other residents of the reserve. This 
has also served as a lesson across the border as a case which was launch by several 
San communities in Namibia has been using the framework of class action rather than 
individually based claim. 
 
Overall, looking at both cases of litigation in South Africa and Botswana, 
what is emerging is the importance of a legal theory on ‘indigenous customary title’. 
In both situations, the concerned communities won their case based on the recognition 
that the radical colonial title to land ownership, and its ensuing post colonial legacy, 
have not ‘extinguished’ indigenous peoples’ land rights, and that their rights to land 
form part of the contemporary legal framework governing land laws at the same level 
than other statutory and jurisprudential rights. Comparative legal analysis has played 
an important role in these decisions. The courts have highlighted the importance of 
integrating indigenous peoples’ customary land rights within the mixed and pluri-
legal African systems. It is in this mix of common law, Roman-Dutch, civil statutory 
laws and customary law that a specific African approach to the meaning and content 
indigenous peoples’ land rights appears. In terms of legal theories regarding 
indigenous peoples’ land rights, it is important that the recognition of possession and 
customary law as a source of land rights does not come with the limitation of 
extinguishment which has been developed in common law countries such as Australia 
and Canada. Indeed under the common law doctrine, Aboriginal or Native titles are 
submitted to the “illegitimate assumption of State power to extinguish such title.”48 
Instead the courts in South Africa and Botswana adopted a less State centric approach 
to indigenous peoples’ land rights putting forward the power of customary laws. 
Whilst, to some extent the approach builds on the Aboriginal/Native title theories, it 
includes indigenous land laws within a much more equalitarian footing with other 
47 More recently in 2014, five residents have lodged a new claim for the recognition of their right to hunt within the reserve, as without the possibility to hunt life in the reserve is impossible. 48 Final working paper prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Indigenous peoples and their relationship to land, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 (2001), at 38 
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competing right. This approach is very specific to Africa, and arguably more 
compelling, as indigenous title seems to be less fragile and less totalising as it is not 
submitted to a nearly impossible burden of proof that marks the common law theories 
on aboriginal title. 49 The emergence of an African indigenous title theory, or as 
captured by McHugh the ‘creolisation’ of indigenous title theory, is based on a more 
atomised place for customary collective rights.50 It is also developed with a better 
inclusion of human rights principles of equality and non-discrimination which were 
clearly articulated by the petitioners and their legal teams as essential element of land 
rights.  
 
III.     LITIGATING AGAINST CONSERVATION, DEVELOPMENT AND 
TOURISM 
 
For many indigenous communities across the continent, wildlife conservation, 
economic development and tourism have often become synonymous with destitution 
and loss of lands.51 In the name of development or conservation, indigenous peoples 
have often been pushed away from their traditional lands, losing access to their 
ancestral territories and the essential natural resources contained on these lands.52 
Several indigenous communities have suffered from “aggressive conservationist 
initiatives” that have often resulted in their forced expulsion from natural reserves or 
other wildlife protection areas.53 The other major negative factor affecting indigenous 
peoples relates to large-scale developmental projects on indigenous territories, 
including for examples dams, logging, mining and other related infrastructures. These 
developments regularly lead to forced eviction, loss of lands and livelihoods, 
destitution and environmental degradation. All these initiatives are usually undertaken 
in the name of development. When it comes to development and exploitation of 
natural resources, States often put forward the argument that they cannot stop these 
large-scale developments that will bring significant wealth to the whole country to 
protect just a few marginalised indigenous peoples.54 Tourism is another ‘plague’ 
affecting indigenous peoples across the continent. The massive boost of the tourism 
industry over the last few decades has had a dramatic impact on indigenous peoples as 
their territories are often located on tourism hotspots. In this context, tourism often 
49 See P. McHugh, Aboriginal Title: The Modern Jurisprudence of Tribal Land Rights (OUP, 2011) 50 P. McHugh, personal communication during the Half-Day Workshop on 'Adjudication and Indigenous Peoples', Queen Mary University, 27 January 2016 51 See Laura A. Young and Korir Sing’Oei, Land, livelihoods and identities: Inter-community 
conflicts in East Africa (MRG, 2011) 52 See Human Rights Committee: Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, Report of the Human Rights Committee, GAOR, 43th Sess., Supp. 40 (A/43/40); Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984 (26 March 1990), UN Doc. Supp. No.40 (A/45/40) at 1 (1990); Hopu and Bessert v. France, Communication No.549/1993, UN Doc. CPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1  (29 December 1997) 53 See: M. Sapignoli and R. Hitchcock, People, Parks, and Power: The Ethics of Conservation-Related 
Resettlement (forthcoming 2016) 54 See: M. Blaser, Harvey A. Feit, and G. McRae (eds.), In the Way of Development: Indigenous 
Peoples, Life Projects and Globalization (Zed/IDRC 2004).  
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results in forced relocation, loss of livelihoods and the exploitation of indigenous 
peoples’ own cultural asserts without due recognition and benefits. Hence it is not 
surprising that most cases of litigation concern these three ‘plagues’: development, 
conservation and tourism. For example, on the aforementioned case from Botswana, 
one of the central arguments in defence of the forced removal of the community by 
the government was that such removal was done in the interest of conservation, 
tourism, and development.55 Likewise the case in South Africa concerned mining 
interests and development. All these issues of development, conservation and tourism 
were also at the heart of the litigation between the Endorois community and the 
government of Kenya.  
 
A. The Right to Development and the Endorois in Kenya  
 
The Endorois are a predominantly pastoralist society living in Kenya’s Rift 
Valley, and their practice of pastoralism has consisted of grazing their animals in the 
lowlands around Lake Bogoria. A Game Reserve has been established on their 
territory, and several game lodges, roads and a hotel have been built on their land. 
The government has also granted a concession for ruby mining on part of the territory. 
After years of frustrating negotiations and litigation at the national level, the Endorois 
community decided to take their case to the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. 56  The Endorois alleged violations resulting from their forced 
displacement of from their ancestral lands, the failure to adequately compensate them 
for the loss of their property, the disruption of their pastoralist way of life and 
violations of the right to practise their religion and culture, as well as the overall 
process of development of the Endorois people.  
 
A central argument of the government was that tourism and the exploitation of 
natural resources (notably ruby mining) would bring significant resources to the 
region. The government highlighted the fact that the project for tourism around Lake 
Borogia was seen as a potential positive development and all the revenues raised by 
the Game Reserves were re-used to support development projects carried out by the 
County Council for the area. One of the arguments put forward by the government 
was that the establishment “of a Game Reserve under the Wildlife laws of Kenya is 
with the objective of ensuring that wildlife is managed and conserved to yield to the 
nation in general and to individual areas in particular optimum returns in terms of 
cultural, aesthetic and scientific gains as well as economic gains as are incidental to 
proper wildlife management and conservation.” 57  Overall, the government was 
arguing that other communities, and the country as a whole was to benefit from the 
55 Also worth noting that even though mining was not put forward as a ground for relocation, there is now a diamond mine in the southeast of the reserve, a planned copper–silver mine in the northwest, and several mining prospects pending elsewhere. 56 Communication 276/2003, Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights 
Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya (2010) 57 Id., para. 178 
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development. They also added that the community knew about the mining concession 
and would benefit from its exploitation. The government concluded that “the task of 
communities within a participatory democracy is to contribute to the well-being of 
society at large and not only to care selfishly for one’s own community at the risk of 
others.”58  
 
On their side, the Endorois argued that these developments were taking place in 
violation of their right to development protected under Article 22 of the African 
Charter which states: “All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and 
cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal 
enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.” Based on this article the Endorois 
highlighted that the imposed decision of the government to proceed with these 
developments on their lands put them into a situation of disenfranchisement by losing 
access to a land essential to ensure the maintenance of their pastoralist way of life. 
The pastoralist community contended that the government had violated their right to 
development by its failure to adequately involve them in the development process 
taking place on their customary lands as well as its failure to ensure the continued 
improvement of the community’s well-being. They highlighted that in forcing such 
developmental projects on their lands the government “did not embrace a rights-based 
approach to economic growth, which insists on development in a manner consistent 
with, and instrumental to, the realisation of human rights and the right to development 
through adequate and prior consultation.”59 It is not so much the legitimacy of the 
decision of the government in turning the land into a tourism and wildlife reserve that 
the community was contesting but rather the way the decisions were made and 
notably the lack of consideration to their culture and survival. They emphasised that 
the Game Reserve and their pastoralist way of life should not be mutually exclusive. 
Linking self-determination and development, they stressed that they had “suffered a 
loss of well-being through the limitations on their choice and capacities, including 
effective and meaningful participation in projects that will affect them.” 60  The 
community highlighted that “self-determination also include the ability to dispose of 
natural resources as a community wishes, thereby requiring a measure of control over 
the land.”61 
 
In terms of legal jurisprudence, the position of the two parties on the meaning of 
the right to development made it a very compelling case since there have been very 
few cases of litigation on the right to development. Under international human rights 
law there has been debates on the theoretical implications of the right to development 
but very rare instances of legal adjudication.62 In general the right to development has 
58 Id., para. 270 59 Id, para. 135  60 Id., para. 129 61 Id., para. 129 62 For a review and references, see: M. Salomon and A. Sengupta, “The right to development: obligations of states and the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples” (Minority Rights Group 
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not been seen as a justiciable right. Regarding the scope of the right to development, 
the African Commission highlighted that “the right to development is a two-pronged 
test, that it is both constitutive and instrumental, or useful as both a means and an 
end.”63 Adopting a pragmatic focus, the Commission concentrated on two principal 
issues: (1) to what extent was the community was (or not) consulted prior to the 
establishment of the wildlife reserve on their territories and (2) whether such 
development provides benefit to the concerned community. The Commission found 
that the lack of “meaningful participation” by the Endorois who “were informed of 
the impending project [on their land] as a fait accompli” was a violation of the right to 
development. The Commission found that the government had violated the right of 
the indigenous community to their culture, land, and development. It rejected the 
argument put forward by the government that the community’s rights should be 
‘sacrificed’ in the name of development, tourism and conservation. Instead the 
Commission underscored that a fair balance should be struck insuring that the 
community would also benefit and participate to these developments. From a global 
legal perspective, this aspect of the case is extremely appealing since there are few 
cases that have specifically focused on the right to development in the context of 
large-scale developmental projects taking place on indigenous peoples’ territories. 
This legal reasoning could have some important echoes across the continent as most 
government usually justify the forced displacement of marginalised indigenous 
communities on the basis that it is necessary to allow development, conservation and 
tourism. 
 
 
B. Tourism, Corporations and The Maasai in Tanzania 
 
Three indigenous Maasai communities in northern Tanzania find themselves 
in the middle of a complex legal battle to reclaim their rights over their ancestral lands 
and resources following the wrongful acquisition of their lands by private 
corporations.64 In 2010, the concerned Maasai villagers had filed a petition to the 
local High Court in Arusha after they were forced from their land and blocked from 
vital water sources to make way for a luxury safari camp near the world-famous 
Serengeti National Park. The safari camp is run by a subsidiary Tanzania entity of a 
US-based Safari Company, Thomson-Wineland Adventures Inc., also known as 
Thomson Safaris. In 2006, Thomson’s affiliate, Tanzania Conservation Ltd. (TCL), 
acquired 12,617 acres of land known as “Sukenya Farm,” which had traditionally 
International, 2003); D. Aguirre, The Human Right To Development In A Globalized World (2008); K. De Feyter, World Development Law (2001); M. Salomon, Global Responsibility For Human 
Rights: World Poverty And The Development Of International Law (2007). 63 Endorois Case, supra note 55, para. 277 64  Mondorosi, Sukenya and Soitsambu Village Councils v Tanzania Breweries Limited, Tanzania 
Conservation Ltd, Ngorongoro District Council, Commissioner for Lands and Attorney-General (Tanzania), see: http://minorityrights.org/law-and-legal-cases/mondorosi-sukenya-and-soitsambu-village-councils-v-tanzania-breweries-limited-tanzania-conservation-ltd-ngorongoro-district-council-commissioner-for-lands-and-attorney-general-tanzania/  
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been used by the Maasai communities. Their legal claim reposes on a complex and 
historical battle over the land which started in 1984 when the government-owned 
Tanzania Breweries Limited (TBL) acquired 10,000 acres at Sukenya Farm, without 
any consultations, consent or compensation of the local communities. The aim of the 
brewery company was to cultivate barley and wheat, but ultimately it only used a very 
small parcel of the land (700 acres), while the remaining part of the land was in usage 
by the Maasai communities for grazing and watering their livestock. In 2006, the land 
was then sold to the Tanzania subsidiary of Thomson Safari without any form of 
consultation, or involvement of the indigenous pastoralists communities.  
 
The indigenous communities challenged the legality of the acquisition of their 
lands in a petition to the High Court. Their claim was notably based on the fact that it 
did not follow required conditions of consultation and compensation. In their 
complaint to the court the villagers also highlighted that their continuous peaceful 
occupation of the land since it was wrongly acquired in 1984 made them the rightful 
owner of the land under the theory of acquired rights. The asked the court to 
recognise the illegality of the acquisition of the land by the US based Safari 
Company. In their application the villagers requested the court to revoke the 
company’s land title, prevent them from converting the land’s designated use from 
pastoralism to tourism, and award damages for the injuries they have suffered due to 
their exclusion from the land. However, in 2015, the High Court ruled against the 
villagers apart from a minor point concerning an illegal transfer of part of the land, 
but no damages were awarded to the communities. 65  Whilst this undoubtedly 
represents an important setback for the applicants, there are some important legal 
aspects of their legal battle that need to be highlighted.  
 
An important aspect of the case relates to the allegation against the act of the 
corporation based in the US. Legally the communities could not take direct legal 
action against the US based corporation in a local court as it had operated under its 
subsidiary based in Tanzania. With the assistance of Earth Rights International, an 
international NGO based in the US, the three Maasai communities turned to a US 
federal court to support their on-going legal battle over the land they lost to Thomson 
Safaris. 66 The federal court action was filed under the Foreign Legal Assistance 
(FLA) Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1782), a law that allows people to obtain documents and 
information from individuals or companies in the US to support foreign legal 
proceedings. The aim of the legal action in the US was to show that Thomson Safari 
knew that the land confiscation was illegal and were aware of the extremely negative 
consequences that such illegal acquisition would have for the communities.  The 
documents and information that were made available through this legal proceeding in 
65 See: “MRG deeply disappointed by Arusha Court land rights judgment against Loliondo Maasai”, at: http://minorityrights.org/2015/10/28/mrg-deeply-disappointed-by-arusha-court-land-rights-judgment-against-loliondo-maasai/  66 See: http://www.earthrights.org/media/maasai-villagers-turn-us-courts-information-abusive-evictions-us-safari-company  
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the US could be essential to support the claim of the communities in Tanzania. It was 
also an innovative and novel way – not much used in the US - of bringing the 
litigation ‘home’.  
 
Whilst the situation in this case might sound very specific it reflects on the 
situation faced by many indigenous communities across the globe. In many situations 
private corporations acquire indigenous territories under quite similar processes using 
nationally or locally registered sub-contractor or subsidiaries to conduct their 
operations on indigenous territories. From this perspective, the complexity of the legal 
action that the Maasai villagers had to go though is a good indicator of the complexity 
of the legal strategy that many indigenous communities have to face when 
multinational corporate interests are invading their territories. It also shows how 
international supports from international actors could be crucial to engaged in such 
transnational litigation.  
 
 
IV.     LACK OF IMPLEMENTATION, STRATEGIC LITIGATION AND 
LEGAL EMPOWERMENT  
 
For many marginalised indigenous communities taking legal action is a daunting 
process. It is complex, technical, lengthy and costly. Moreover, there is no guarantee 
of wining a case, and even in case of victory the prospects of implementation are 
often tenuous. Nonetheless, as this article has examined many very marginalised 
indigenous communities are engaging with litigation. This last section wishes to 
examine some of the hurdles faced by indigenous peoples in engaging with litigation 
with the aim of offering a reflection on the reasons that are pushing indigenous 
peoples to engage with litigation. The aim is to examine to what extent litigation is 
part of a strategy for social change (referred to as strategic litigation) and to what 
extent it participates to the legal empowerment of marginalised indigenous 
communities. To undertake such analysis, the following discussion is based on three 
important phases of the litigation process, namely: (1) the pre-trial development of a 
legal strategy and the process of evidence gathering by the communities and their 
legal support team; (2) the trial phase in itself, which is often a lengthy and costly 
process; (3) and the post-ruling phase, which even in the event of a victory in court 
does not signal the end of the legal battle for implementation.  
 
A. Pre-Trial Strategy: Community and Evidence Gatherings in Uganda  
 
The decision to take legal action by the Batwa represents a compelling 
experience about community mobilisation and the development of a legal strategy 
before going to litigation. The Batwa do not live as one united community but live in 
scattered small communities, squatting either at the borders of the lands they have 
been evicted from or in the vicinity of villages or towns that are near the parks. In 
2000, several community leaders, with the support and involvement of outsiders and 
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NGOs, decided to establish the United Organisation for Batwa Development in 
Uganda (UOBDU) as an umbrella organisation to support the Batwa to unite and 
engage in informed advocacy for their rights. UOBDU quickly became a place for 
communities to voice their concerns and share similar stories of discrimination. The 
organisation quickly became the main avenue for them to express their concerns to 
the government, notably through numerous exchanges and discussions with local 
councils, various government departments as well as the Parliament of Uganda. Under 
the umbrella of the organisation the Batwa also started to address international and 
regional human rights mechanisms, which led to the issuance of clear guidance on 
how Uganda should address the human rights situation of the Batwa. However, over 
the years of negotiations and push by international and regional human rights 
institutions, the hope of achieving remedies outside the courts faded as no concrete 
measures were put in place by the national authorities. Worst the overall situation of 
the Batwa kept leading them towards more impoverishment and discrimination. Based 
on the lack of proper engagement from the local and national authorities, the Batwa, 
via their traditional leaders and through discussions with most members of the 
communities, decided to take the government to court.  
 
Initially most of the Batwa would have preferred the option of dialogue and 
negotiations. The predominant view from most of the members of the community was 
in favour of not ‘attacking’ the government in court, as authorities were still seen as 
important and respectful allies necessary to support them. However, after a few years 
of frustration and lack of any proper engagement by the authorities a debate started 
within the community about the next step to follow. In that process, the Batwa had put 
in place a very efficient forum for discussion when representatives of many 
communities will gather together to discuss the process ahead. Over the years that 
forum has proven to be a very powerful agent for the Batwa to express their issues, 
but also to get a sense of empowerment by sharing their common experiences and 
learn about their rights. Through this forum the Batwa started to use a common 
language to express their grievances. Hence when the issue of taking an eventual legal 
action arose, the Batwa had already been developing a common platform to engage 
with the issues to be put forward. This forum was used to express grievances and 
translate these into a legal language. It is within that forum that slowly the decision to 
push for litigation emerged. The representatives of the communities would report 
back to their communities and then report back to the forum about the decisions from 
the other members. As such the decision to take legal action was taken collectively 
though a long process of dialogue.  
 
Once the decision was put forward to take legal action, the forum was then 
used as a platform to build the legal argumentation. An important aspect was to gather 
evidence to bring to court. Generally bringing evidence on land and resources 
ownership is a serious challenge for indigenous communities. As they usually do not 
have an official administrative proof of ownership they have to rely on oral testimony 
and community members’ evidence of usage and possession of the land. Increasingly 
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communities are using mapping technologies, such as GPS and GIS, to support their 
claims. The Batwa faced all these difficulties, adding to the fact that their removal has 
taken place over a long period from the 1920’s until the 1990’s. It meant that many of 
the members of the community had never ‘legally’ live on their ancestral territories. 
Hence the decision was made to record evidence from the eldest of the community 
who had lived on the concerned lands and had faced the eviction. In 2011 the Batwa 
created three-dimensional models of both Bwindi and Mgahinga national parks which 
depicts their spiritual and cultural attachments to the forest and specific sites within 
the forest. At the time of writing, the case has yet to be heard and ruled by the 
Constitutional Court, however many of the issues that came before launching the case 
to the court highlights some important elements regarding the process of legal 
empowerment which goes with a community deciding to use litigation and the 
process of evidence gathering.  
 
B.  Strategy to Support Litigation in Botswana 
 
The aforementioned case from the High Court of Botswana is longest and most 
expensive case ever run in the country’ legal history. The first court case itself run 
from 2004 to 2006, but the legal proceedings started in 2002, and ultimately two other 
cases followed in 2011 and 2015. The fact that in 2006 it was estimated 10% of the 
original applicants in the legal case had died since the CKGR High Court case began 
gives a tragic indication on how strenuous such long term legal action can be on a 
marginalised and deprived community.67 Apart from this dramatic aspect, litigation is 
also a costly process, especially since these cases are usually extremely lengthy and 
technical. Indigenous communities are usually disenfranchised and do not have the 
necessary monetary means to support such long process of litigation. From this 
perspective, all the cases mentioned so far have received some support from legal 
firms and civil society organisation to support them. In the case of the San in 
Botswana, Saugestad has analysed how the support from external actors was essential 
in supporting the indigenous communities both in terms of legal analysis, via the 
involvement of international lawyers, funding, via the support from international 
NGOs, and also advocacy via the use of international media and lobbying groups.68 
As she noted: “there is no way a group of poor illiterate San could have raised the 
case on their own (..).” Originally the applicants and their legal team had envisaged 
that the court case would take about one year, instead of the nearly 11 years it took. 
This meant that financial resources to sustain the case were clearly not sufficient. 
After the first phase of the case, the claimants decided that it would be a good idea to 
hire more lawyers to their defence team. For that purpose a fund-raising tour of the 
67 M. Sapignoli and R. Hitchcock, “A Chronology of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve: Update III, 2002 – 2012”, Botswana Notes and Records 45 (2013), pp. 52-65. 68 S. Saugestad, “Impact of international mechanisms on indigenous rights in Botswana”, 15 (1) International journal of human rights (2011), 37-61 
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US which was sponsored by the Indigenous Land Rights Fund and the Kalahari 
Peoples Fund was initiated.69  
 
 The situation of the San in the CKGR in Botswana has received a significant 
coverage and involvement from INGOs, including some of the most established 
international organisations working in support of indigenous peoples. The 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) has funded First People of 
the Kalahari (FPK) which was instrumental in supporting the capacity-building of the 
community with the legal case. 70  Cultural Survival, one of the largest NGO 
supporting indigenous rights globally has been extremely proactive in producing 
numerous articles, reports and press releases on the central Kalahari. Survival 
International has been especially active producing ‘Urgent Action Bulletins’ on the 
central Kalahari situation, and by providing some funding and support to the legal 
team involved on the side of the applicants in the court case. As highlighted by 
Sapignoli an important element which made the San received such a strong support 
from western NGOs was notably based on the San “receptacle of Western imaginaries 
of anti-modernity and otherness, as peoples” who has such became “a focal point of 
conflict over different understandings of human worth, dignity, and equality.”71 This 
involvement from international NGOs led the government to claim that the case was 
led by foreigners. International and regional human rights organisations also played a 
significant role in the background of the case, by notably putting pressure on the 
authorities regarding the situation in the CKGR.72 For example, in 2005 in the midst 
of the legal case two members of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
visited Botswana.73 Then, in 2006 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights expressed concerns to the government about the treatment of the people of the 
Central Kalahari. The (former) UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples has also played a proactive role in 
reporting on the situation and visiting the country.  
 
The involvement of international actors was not always a positive force as it 
created some dissensions amongst the various local and national organisations 
previously involved. For example, some of the local NGOs pulled out of the 
negotiations because they felt that the approaches being employed by Survival 
69 The lack of funding means that now the organisation First People of the Kalahari which was set up to support the court action has run out of money and closed down. 70 See: R. Hitchcock and M. Enghoff, Capacity Building of First People of the Kalahari: An 
Evaluation (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2004). 71 M. Sapignoli, “Dispossession in the Age of Humanity: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Indigeneity in the Central Kalahari”, (2015) 25 (3) Anthropological Forum, pp. 285-305  72 See M. Sapignoli, Local Power through Globalized Indigenous Identities: The San, the State, and 
the International Community’, (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Essex University -2012).  73 See ACHPR 2008 
 23 
                                                        
International were too aggressive and counter-productive. 74  As analysed in great 
details by Saugestad the involvement of so many international actors, and the 
polarisation that it created between the different local actors “has paradoxically 
endangered the possibility of generating a stronger locally-based movement 
advocating for San rights.”75 The international involvement was also an essential 
ingredient in the establishment of the legal team. The legal team was composed of 
lawyers from South Africa who were joined by a British lawyer when Survival 
International got involved in the case. The role of the lawyers raises several issues, 
not only in this case but also more generally when it comes to litigation on indigenous 
rights. The legal procedures being usually extremely complex and jargonised, lawyers 
representing the indigenous communities tend to become the leaders of the legal 
strategy rather than the community. In the case of Botswana, Saugestad noted that 
“once the case proper started, the formalities of the legal process took control, the 
lawyers took centre stage, and the applicants became spectators.”76 
 
This case shows how essential it was for the applicants to get international 
support, but it also highlight the potential pitfalls of this involvement. The 
international involvement played a positive role in supporting the legal argumentation 
and the advocacy around the case. It was also an essential element in the case 
management and in ensuring the financial sustainability of the court action. However, 
it has also created serious tensions within the national and local setting creating 
dissension between the national human rights actors and the communities. Ironically 
it participated to the lack of direct empowerment of the most concerned individuals 
who became secondary actors to their own court case as the centre stage was taken 
over by international actors, including INGOs and lawyers. In this context it is 
essential to ensure that a cohesive strategy between all partners in the court case is 
define and respected to ensure the direct participation and consultation at all levels of 
the concerned communities, this is certainly an important lesson to be learnt from in 
other cases of litigation which involve the heavy involvement of external actors.  
 
C. Strategy to Support Implementation of the Endorois Decision   
 
Wining a case is undoubtedly an extremely positive outcome, however it is not 
the end of the road as very often the process of implementation is in itself an arduous 
road to follow for communities engaging with litigation. As noted earlier, in 2010 
after years of litigation, the Endorois of Kenya won an important legal battle when the 
African Commission established that the government should restitute their ancestral 
lands, ensure unrestricted access to Lake Bogoria, pay adequate compensation for all 
74 See J. Solway, “Human Rights and NGO ‘Wrongs’: Conflict Diamonds, Culture Wars, and the ‘Bushman question’.” (2009) 79 (3) Africa 329–343.; S. Saugestad, “Impact of International Mechanisms on Indigenous Rights in Botswana.” (2011) 15 (1) The International Journal of Human Rights 37–61.  75 Ibid, Saugestad, 2011, at 56 76 Ibid, Saugestad, 2011, at 44 
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losses suffered, pay royalties regarding existing economic activities, and engage in 
dialogue with the complainants regarding future development on their territory. That 
decision came in 2010, however six years later, at the time of writing, the decision 
still remains to be implemented by the Kenyan government. Unfortunately this is not 
an isolated story as across the globe many indigenous communities who have won a 
case are still awaiting for implementation.  
 
From this perspective an interesting development is taking place in Kenya 
where the community has been leading a process to support the implementation of the 
decision. The community established the Endorois Welfare Council as a platform to 
support their capacity in supporting the litigation. The council now plays a 
considerable role to catalyse the effort and the push to support the community to 
effectively negotiate with the government regarding the implementation of the 
decision. Working alongside other national and international organisations, Minority 
Rights Group (MRG) has been extremely proactive holding strategic meetings, 
organising workshops with leaders of the Endorois community on different options of 
land restitution and compensation, conducting surveys on immaterial losses, analysing 
data on material losses, building the capacity of the Endorois Welfare Council to seek 
implementation, organising paralegal trainings, supporting community outreach and 
seeking the active involvement of African Union and United Nations bodies, 
including the ACHPR holding one of only two hearings on implementation and 
issuing its first ever resolution on non-implementation. As a result of such proactive 
civil society push, in 2014 the government established a ‘Task Force’ to address the 
ACHPR’s decision. Whilst there are some serious limitations regarding this task 
force, notably the fact it is mainly composed of government officials, and that its 
mandate is to “study the Decision”, it nonetheless represents an important platform 
which has emerged following the persistent push from the civil society to support the 
implementation of the legal decision. Moreover, due to the civil society push there has 
been some movements on the part of the government which at the start was quite 
lethargic regarding the implementation of the decision. This experience on supporting 
the implementation could be shared across the continent as non-implementation is not 
unique, nor is it specific to having been adopted by a regional institution rather than 
national courts. For example, so far the government of Botswana has failed to 
implement the ruling issued by the High Court in 2006. In many ways the lack of 
implementation raises the question of the viability and usefulness of litigation. As 
highlighted litigation takes lots of resources, time and energy from the communities, 
hence the prospect of non-implementation puts serious doubt the viability of using 
courts as an agent of change.  
 
Nonetheless what the litigation process in Kenya as well as the other cases that 
have been examined in this article are showing is the important role that litigation 
plays as a tool to support legal empowerment of the concerned communities. In all the 
situations examined the concerned communities are extremely marginalised, and are 
usually facing some serious forms of discrimination from the rest of the society. They 
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have highlighted that taking legal action is often an important catalyse to support their 
affirmation as equal citizens of the State entitled to a voice. As powerfully captured 
by Sapignoli in the context of Botswana, litigation can have important effects as not 
only it put into the open the illegality of the government’s action against its own 
citizens, but it also “reinstated the applicants’ ‘right to have rights’, as those who, as 
citizens, can bring their own government to court and refer to state laws to have their 
rights recognised.”77 This analysis could be replicated in the context of Kenya, but 
also more generally for all the indigenous communities who have been engaging with 
litigation. It transpires that outside the pure issue of victory or not in court, litigation 
supports community building and push communities to develop a legal strategy to get 
the recognition of their rights. In itself this process contributes to the empowerment of 
the communities in reclaiming their rights and becoming suddenly visible and entitled 
citizens of the State. From this perspective engaging in litigation can be seen as an 
important element in terms of a larger strategy for visibility and political 
empowerment despite the potential lack of implementation of the decisions.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As indicated in the introduction this article has two main objectives, first to 
examine to what extent a jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ rights is emerging 
across the continent, and secondly to explore the challenges and limitation of using 
litigation as a tool for social changes. In terms of the development of an African 
jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ rights, the current wave of litigation on 
indigenous peoples’ rights supports the emergence of a systematic set of principles. 
This includes the increased reference to the legal term ‘indigenous peoples’ as 
developed under international law, notably as a way to recognise the historical 
marginalisation and discrimination faced by indigenous communities. Courts have 
started to refer to the rights of indigenous peoples as a way to condemn governments 
for not taking proactive and systematic legal measures to recognise indigenous 
peoples’ rights. In this context it could be argued that the legal category of 
‘indigenous peoples’ has allowed communities (sometimes divided by colonisation) 
to re-assert their rights, using the concept of ‘indigeneity’ as a means of defining 
themselves as peoples entitled to specific rights. The references to indigenous 
peoples’ rights as defined under international and regional law has allowed 
communities to highlight that: (1) they are different from the majority population; (2) 
that they have been historically been mistreated and discriminated against; and (3) 
that this treatment occurred in part because of their lifestyles and distinct cultural 
attributes.  
 
77 M. Sapignoli, “Dispossession in the Age of Humanity: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Indigeneity in the Central Kalahari”, (2015) 25 (3) Anthropological Forum, p. 18 (references omitted)  
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The related factor emerging from the cases examined relates to the emergence of 
an African jurisprudence on land rights and natural resources for indigenous peoples. 
As mentioned earlier there is the emergence of an African approach to land rights 
which tackles the inherent colonial land legacy by putting forward the fact that 
indigenous peoples customary land rights have not only survived colonisation and its 
ensuing independence, but also form part of contemporary land rights. In a general 
context when most of Africa is witnessing an intense ‘land grab’, the recognition of a 
specific right for indigenous peoples to land is certainly an important breakthrough. 
The other important factor of the emerging jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ 
rights relates to the narrative of development. Across the continent indigenous 
peoples are often the victims of imposed forms of development resulting in 
displacement, forced relocation and destitution. All the cases examined in this article 
highlight how courts are appearing as a possible way to challenge the top down 
narrative of development imposed by States by putting forward the need to recognise 
the rights of indigenous peoples in this context. In examining the condition that led to 
the acquisition of indigenous territories and the way development was used as a 
justification for their removal, courts are starting to engage with the issue. However, it 
is not yet entirely clear to what extent courts could become a place to challenge the 
dominant narrative on development which usually justified the removal of indigenous 
peoples from their lands on the grounds of nature conservation, development, and the 
need to support ‘under-developed’ segments of the society into modernisation. Whilst 
there are glimpses of the potential role that courts could play in this context, apart 
from the decision from the African Commission, there is yet no convincing 
engagement with the issue of development in the emerging jurisprudence. This is 
most probably the next important step into the development of a specific African 
jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ rights knowing how development, conservation 
and tourism are affecting communities across the continent.   
 
The second set of remarks relates to the more practical aspects of engaging with 
litigation. As noted earlier litigation is a lengthy, technical and costly process usually 
requiring the involvement of external actors. This includes local/national/international 
NGOs with external funding. Based on the experiences of the communities who have 
engaged in this process, two important points seem to emerge. First, relying on this 
source of external support is unpredictable. NGOs are very often submitted to short 
term funding and objectives, whereas litigation is long term and unpredictable. In 
result it means that indigenous peoples have to rely on a multitude of changing actors 
to support their case. As examined in the case of Botswana, it is hard to develop a 
long-term strategy on litigation relying on several different sources of funding and 
support. The second related issue is that such involvement from external actors has 
implications regarding the way the legal strategy is developed. External actors will 
engage based on their own visions and interests in what should be put forward in the 
litigation. This might not always match and relate to the interest and vision of the 
concerned community. As noted earlier this could lead some serious tensions between 
the different civil society supporters but also within the communities. Importantly it 
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also means that the communities could easily lose control on the content of the 
arguments put forward to the courts. The technicality of the legal language used by 
the lawyers, the judges and the NGOs can alienate indigenous peoples who are 
becoming secondary actors to their own court case. From this perspective the 
approach developed by the supporting organisations is an essential element of the 
court case, as it needs to be based on a very inclusive, open and clear participatory 
model. This takes time and energy, but it can result in an important empowering 
platform for the communities.   
 
Finally, as a last remark, and to open the debate further, it is worth noting the 
irony that courts, which are a part of the legal and political systems that has 
discriminated against indigenous peoples, are being approached for remedies. 
Historically, law and legal institutions have played a significant role in the alienation 
and marginalisation of indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples are asking the very 
system that has contributed to the prejudice to determine whether or not the prejudice 
is justified. This can surely never be the best path to solve the problem. As noted in all 
the cases examined, indigenous peoples have usually preferred to engage in 
negotiations with the government rather than litigation. Litigation came as a last resort 
after years of frustration. Litigation comes at the last possible remedy when dialogue 
has failed, offering an important last step in a strategy to get recognition of their 
rights. These cases provide a good illustration on how litigation can be used as a way 
to get political recognition (irrespective of the results or implementation of the cases), 
and how litigation can support the legal empowerment of extremely marginalised 
indigenous communities. The court process itself is only one part of the story, as 
engaging with courts demands a huge effort in term of political and structural 
organisations from the communities, an effort which contributes to their 
empowerment irrespective of the courts proceedings.  
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